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Abstract
It is widely agreed that there is a crisis in labour/employment standards enforcement. A key issue
is the role of deterrence measures that penalise violations. Employment standards enforcement in
Ontario, like in most jurisdictions, is based mainly on a compliance framework promoting
voluntary resolution of complaints and, if that fails, ordering restitution. Deterrence measures that
penalise violations are rarely invoked. However, the Ontario government has recently increased
the role of proactive inspections and tickets, a low-level deterrence measure which imposes fines
of $295 plus victim surcharges. In examining the effectiveness of the use of tickets in inspections,
we begin by looking at this development in the broader context of employment standards
enforcement and its historical trajectory. Then, using administrative data from the Ministry of
Labour, we examine when and why tickets are issued in the course of workplace inspections. After
demonstrating that even when ticketable violations are detected, tickets are issued only rarely, we
explore factors associated with an increased likelihood of an inspector issuing a ticket. Finally, we
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consider how the overall deterrent effect of workplace inspections is influenced by the use or nonuse of deterrence tools.

JEL codes: J88
Keywords
Canada, compliance, deterrence, employment standards, labour standards, Ontario, tickets,
violations

I. Introduction
While we often hear about struggles to raise the minimum wage and other labour standards, the
issue of their enforcement receives far less attention. Yet without effective enforcement, improved
labour standards will fail to achieve their objective. While this observation is not novel (eg, Burns
1926: 146-47), researchers repeatedly find that labour standards enforcement fails to make
workers’ rights real. A recent United States investigation concluded that ‘[w]age laws are poorly
enforced, with workers often unable to recover back pay even after government rules in their favor’
(Levine, 2018). Dickens (2012: 206-07) found that ‘enforcement in Britain is flawed in that too
much reliance is placed on individuals having to assert and pursue their statutory employment
rights, which generally require only passive compliance from employers …’. In Australia, Hardy
(2016: 107) concludes that ‘[t]he compliance and enforcement problems which have been brought
to light in the past year are complex, challenging and profound’.
While there is no simple answer to the question of how to strengthen labour standards
enforcement, deterrence is generally agreed to play an important role. Yet many studies find that
employers are rarely penalised for violating their workers’ rights. In the province of Ontario,
Canada, employment standards (ES) enforcement has focused principally on encouraging
voluntary compliance and, if that fails, ordering restitution. Deterrence measures that penalise
violations are rarely invoked. This approach to the enforcement of protective employment laws
has a long history (Tucker, 1990) and many worker advocates and academic researchers have
argued that it results in regulatory failure (Bernstein et al., 2003).
The limited role of deterrence measures in Canada is not unique to Ontario. For example,
Gesualdi-Fecteau and Vallée (2016) have found little use of penal provisions in Quebec, while
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researchers in British Columbia (BC) report that proactive enforcement has been abandoned and
that enforcement staff has been reduced by half since 2000/2001 despite a 25% increase in
establishments with employees (BC Employment Standards Coalition, 2017).
In this article, we scrutinise the use of tickets in ES enforcement in Ontario. Tickets are a lowlevel deterrence measure made available to Employment Standards Officers (ESOs) in 2004 when
the government amended regulations under the Provincial Offences Act (POA) to make 58
violations of the Employment Standards Act (ESA) ticketable and subject to fines of $295 plus
victim surcharges. In particular, we focus on the use of tickets in the context of workplace
inspections, which is one of two ways in which ESA violations may come to the attention of ESOs,
the other way being via individual complaints.
Most enforcement resources in Ontario are dedicated to addressing individual workers'
complaints that their employers have violated their rights. Indeed, this is the principal way in which
violations are detected and resolved. Nevertheless, in response to widespread criticism of the
limitations of a complaints-based enforcement model, in recent years the Ontario government
increased the role of proactive workplace inspections and introduced a program of targeted
inspections, known as blitzes. This initiative represents a limited but potentially meaningful
change in the government’s overall approach to ES enforcement and, therefore, merits scrutiny in
order to assess how deterrence measures are used in this particular context.
The analysis begins with a brief discussion of the role of deterrence in ES enforcement and
the deterrence measures available under the ESA. It then turns to a detailed empirical examination
of the use of tickets in workplace inspections, including the prevalence of tickets, the types of
violations that result in tickets, and when and why tickets are used, with a focus on workplaces
that have been inspected more than once. We conclude with a discussion of the overall use of
tickets in ES enforcement, looking at both the pattern of practice in Ontario and broader questions
about the use of low-level deterrence measures in regulatory enforcement systems.

II. Deterrence in ES enforcement
Approaches to regulatory enforcement are either compliance-focused or deterrence-focused.
Compliance-focused approaches prioritise the role of the state in assisting duty holders to meet
their legal obligations through education about what those obligations are and how best to meet
them. The assumption is that most employers want to comply with the law and that violations are
3

largely the result of ignorance or incompetence. Therefore, the most productive approach to
securing compliance is for ESOs to win the trust of employers by demonstrating a non-punitive
approach, gently guiding employers onto the right path while ensuring that employees who have
been deprived of their statutory entitlements get restitution. In contrast, deterrence-focused
approaches, assume that much, if not most, wrongdoing is based on a calculation of the costs of
compliance relative to the risks of non-compliance. If duty holders believe that there is little risk
of violations being detected or that if they are detected the severity of punishment is low, then they
will more likely to violate the law. Therefore, effective enforcement requires the state to change
that calculation by increasing the risk of detection and/or the severity of punishment. Such an
approach will specifically deter individuals and will also produce general deterrence as knowledge
of the government’s approach to enforcement becomes widespread.
Recently, regulators and researchers have recognised that effective enforcement requires a
combination of compliance and deterrence. One such model is responsive regulation (Ayres and
Braithewaite, 1992) which posits that regulators should initially approach duty holders as wellintentioned and provide compliance assistance, resorting to deterrence measures of increasing
severity only if compliance or low-level deterrence measures fail. This set of assumptions yields
the well-known enforcement pyramid. Although it is expected that deterrence measures will not
be needed in most cases, it is vital that they are available and used when necessary. A second,
more recent approach is the strategic enforcement model developed by Weil (2008, 2010, 2014).
Weil looks at the contextual factors that increase the likelihood of employer ES violations,
including the fissuring of employer responsibility that results in shifting work out of large firms
and into environments subject to intense competitive pressures. Strategic enforcement aims to
respond to this environment by building on four principles: prioritisation, deterrence,
sustainability, and systemic effects. Clearly, deterrence plays a larger role in strategic enforcement
than in responsive regulation, but in both scenarios, it remains only one element of a broader
regulatory approach in which compliance strategies play a role, including working with lead firms
to secure their cooperation in achieving compliance by their franchisees, contractors, or suppliers.
Despite the differences between these models, they both situate deterrence as an essential
element of an effective regulatory enforcement strategy. Yet in Ontario relatively few ES
violations result in the use of a low-level deterrence measure by an ESO, and higher-level
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deterrence measures appear to be used only when employers defy the authority of the state by
refusing to comply with an order to pay or interfere with an ESO.
Notwithstanding this general finding, it is important to consider how deterrence operates in
particular components of the enforcement process. As noted, ES enforcement in Ontario is largely
complaint-based. Three-quarters of all violations are detected through complaints and much of the
Ministry of Labour's (MOL’s) Employment Standards Program staff and resources are devoted to
complaint resolution. Nevertheless, the role of proactive inspections grew steadily after the
province’s Auditor General drew attention to the virtual disappearance of workplace inspections
in 2004. In more recent years, the MOL has adopted a targeted inspection strategy that seeks to
prioritise sectors of the economy or the workforce where it believes that ES violations are more
frequent. In light of this shift, a study of the use of deterrence measures and tickets in particular
during inspections is warranted.
Before turning to the empirical dimension of the investigation, it is helpful to examine the
deterrence tools available in ES enforcement in Ontario. Rather than begin with low-level
deterrence tools, for historical reasons we start by describing the most severe deterrence tool, the
criminal law. The architecture of the Canadian constitution draws a very sharp distinction between
criminal and regulatory law. This distinction flows from the fact that criminal law is a matter of
exclusive federal jurisdiction and so provinces cannot create criminal penalties for the violation of
provincial statutes. Employment regulation is considered a matter of property and civil rights and
therefore is principally a provincial responsibility; as a result, violations of the ESA cannot be
made crimes by the province. However, the federal government may choose to treat some
employer misconduct that also involves breaches of provincial statutes as crimes, especially where
there is an element of intentional behaviour. Thus, in 1935, the federal government criminalised
the intentional violation of minimum wage laws, a provision that remained on the books until 1954,
although for a variety of reasons it was unenforceable (Tucker, 2017).
Provincial laws normally make their violation a regulatory offence. For example, the ESA
makes it an offence to contravene the Act or its regulations, or to fail to comply with an order or
direction issued by an ESO (s. 132). Regulatory offences are strict liability offences in that there
is no need to prove intent, only that the law was violated. Individuals are liable to be fined up to
$50,000 or imprisoned for up to 12 months. Corporations are liable to be fined up to $100,000 for
a first offence, $250,000 for a second offence, and $500,000 for a third or subsequent offence.
5

There are also provisions allowing directors and officers of corporations to be prosecuted and
punished under certain circumstances (ss.136, 137). Prosecutions of this kind are initiated by a
formal charge known as an ‘information’ and the procedures to be followed are governed by Part
III of the POA.
For many years, Part III prosecutions were the only deterrence tool available to enforce the
ESA, yet they were rarely initiated. In addition to the general aversion of enforcement officials to
act like police (Hawkins, 1984; Kagan, 1984), Part III prosecutions are time-consuming. ESOs can
only recommend prosecutions; the ultimate decision is made by the Legal Services Branch (LSB)
of the MOL, acting as Crown. This cumbersome process led regulators to develop lower-level
deterrence tools that could be applied with greater ease. In 2000, the government amended the
ESA to give ESOs the power to issue a Notice of Compliance (NOC). Section 113 of the ESA
provides: “If an employment standards officer believes that a person has contravened a provision
of this Act, the officer may issue a notice to the person setting out the officer’s belief and the
prescribed penalty for that contravention.” Crucially, NOCs may be issued for any contravention
of the Act and so are widely available. Ontario Regulation 289/01 sets out the prescribed penalties:
at the time of writing, $250 for a first contravention, $500 for a second contravention, and $1,000
for a third or subsequent contravention. NOCs can be served in a variety of ways, including mail,
fax, and email (s. 95). An entity served with a NOC is deemed to be guilty and liable to pay the
penalty unless they apply to the Ontario Labour Relations Board for a review within 30 days.
NOCs are best conceptualised as an administrative penalty, rather than a regulatory offence, since
they are not governed by the POA and the judiciary is not involved at any stage.
The second low-level compliance tool, tickets, was created in 2004 by an amendment to
Regulation 950 (O.Reg. 162/04) of the POA, and aimed ostensibly to protect vulnerable employees
in instances of relatively minor offences (Ontario Ministry of Labour, 2004). Violations of specific
statutes can be prosecuted by a ‘certificate of offence’ or ticket, under Part I of the POA, a simpler
procedure than a Part III prosecution. Importantly, tickets can be issued by ESOs – who are
provincial offence officers – but, unlike NOCs, they must be served personally on the accused.
ESOs do not need to involve the ESB in the decision to issue a ticket, although the LSB may
become involved if the accused contests a ticket. There are currently a total of 58 ticketable ESA
violations that can be categorised into three main groupings: administrative violations (such as
record keeping), monetary violations (failure to pay wages or failure to pay vacation pay), and
6

non-monetary substantive violations (hours of work exceeds limit). The amount of the fine is set
by the Chief Justice of the Ontario Court of Justice and currently is $295. As well, a victim fine
surcharge and an administrative fee are added to each fine (O.Reg. 161/00) so that the total payable
for each ticket is $360.
Theoretically, a NOC could be issued for each ticketable violation. However, the MOL
Administrative Manual for Employment Standards (AMES) (2017, S. 7.5.7) stipulates that ESOs
should issue tickets rather than NOCs, and this is the practice of ESOs (Vosko, Noack and Tucker,
2016). In fact, NOCs are used quite infrequently in the context of workplace inspections (Table
1), and for that reason we focus on the use of tickets.
The AMES (S. 7A.2) also states that the objective of prosecution policy for both Part I tickets
and Part III prosecutions is to ensure compliance with minimum standards set out in the ESA. It
further states that the purpose of prosecution is both specific and general deterrence and that the
decision to prosecute should be based on a number of considerations once it has been determined
there is sufficient evidence to establish the offence. These considerations include: the seriousness
or gravity of the offence, the history of compliance, mitigating or aggravating circumstances, the
availability of effective alternatives to prosecution, program identification of targeted
contraventions, and the necessity of maintaining public confidence in the legislation. The manual
elaborates on these considerations (S. 7A.3) and then advises ESOs generally to use tickets for
first offenders of less serious offences (S. 7A.4.1).

III. The use of tickets in workplace inspections
A. Methods
In examining the use of tickets in workplace inspections, we draw on the Ontario MOL's
Employment Standards Information System (ESIS), a repository of data on Ontario’s ES
enforcement that is not otherwise publically available.1 As ESIS was designed for administrative
purposes, such as tracking and record-keeping, rather than for research purposes, it has not
undergone the same quality control and data verification process as survey data from large
statistical agencies. However, as a complete record of workplace inspections conducted under the
ESA, ESIS data provide key insights into ESA enforcement unavailable from any other source.
Our focus is on workplace inspections completed from 2012/13 to 2015/16, the most recent fiscal2
years for which near-complete data are available. Since we rely on the fiscal year in which an
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inspection was conducted, these findings may differ from reports issued by the MOL, which
typically report tickets using their conviction date.
B. The scope and types of inspections
Workplace inspections in Ontario focus primarily on 11 standards, which are stipulated in the
AMES (Ch. 4, 3):


Poster requirements



Wage statements



Unauthorized deductions



Record keeping



Hours of work



Eating periods



Overtime pay



Minimum wage



Public holidays



Vacation with pay



Temporary help agencies charging employees fees and providing information.

A full inspection will cover all 11 standards, but sometimes inspections will be limited to a subset of them. Other times, albeit rarely, standards outside this list, such as unpaid wages, will also
be assessed.
Inspections can be divided conceptually into three main types. The first type are expanded
investigations launched when an ESO detects a violation from an individual complaint that is
included in the 11 standards that are investigated during an inspection and has reason to believe
other employees are affected similarly. Expanded investigations bridge the reactive/proactive
divide insofar as they are initiated by a complaint, but become proactive by seeking to discover
whether non-complaining employees suffered the same violation. The other two types of
inspections, blitz and regular inspections, are purely proactive insofar as they are undertaken as
part of a planned program of inspections. Targeted or blitz inspections are initiated by the MOL to
investigate a particular sector in which it suspects a high incidence of ES violations. For example,
the MOL conducted blitz inspections of Temporary Help Agencies in 2012 and 2015 and of nail
8

salons and fast-food restaurants in the context of the vulnerable workers blitz in 2013. Regular
inspections are more random. ESOs select employers for inspection based on regional priorities or
individual discretion.3
C. The prevalence of tickets in inspections
Two different measures are useful when examining the prevalence of tickets in workplace
inspections. The first considers the number of tickets in relation to the total number of ticketable
violations detected and recorded in an inspection. The second considers the number of tickets in
relation to the number of inspections that detected and recorded a ticketable violation.4 Both
measures are important to consider because, as we note below, researchers have investigated the
impact of an inspection with a single deterrent measure that is independent of the total number of
violations detected.
Table 1 provides data on the use of tickets and NOCs both in workplace inspections and for
individual complaints, relative to the number of violations that could be ticketed or subject to a
NOC. Foremost, the table shows that ESOs adhere to the MOL’s policy of favouring tickets over
NOCs, regardless of whether a violation is detected in an inspection or in a complaint. NOCs and
tickets are both used far less frequently in complaints; however, for both complaints and
inspections, NOCs are used typically for less than 1% of all violations. Whereas tickets are used
slightly more often, they are issued far more frequently for ticketable violations detected in
workplace inspections than for those detected in complaints. Reasons for this difference include
the possibility that in the context of complaints ESOs are more focused on dispute resolution than
on deterrence. However, the fact that tickets are used much more frequently in the context of
inspections than in the context of complaints supports our decision to investigate deterrence
practices in workplace inspections separate from complaints.
TABLE 1 HERE

In 2012/13, 6% of ticketable violations detected in workplace inspections resulted in tickets,
whereas in the three subsequent years for which data are available, this percentage rose to roughly
9%. Table 2 presents data on the prevalence of tickets using the number of inspections as the
denominator. It thereby considers the practice of ticketing in relation to the number of inspections
with ticketable violations and presents a very different picture; by this measure, the prevalence of
9

ticketing more than doubles, ranging between 16% and 22%, although the prevalence of ticketing
in 2012/13 is anomalously low compared to subsequent years. The percentage of inspections with
tickets is greater than the percentage of ticketed violations because an ESO may find multiple
ticketable violations on an inspection but can choose to only issue tickets for a select number, a
practice discussed below.

TABLE 2 HERE

D. Types of violations resulting in tickets
Although tickets are more commonly issued in the context of workplace inspections than
individual complaints, little is known about which types of violations prompt an ESO to issue a
ticket. At the most general level, we can compare violations of monetary and non-monetary
standards under the ESA. As Figure 1 illustrates, ESOs are more likely to issue tickets for monetary
violations of ES, compared to non-monetary violations. Whereas between 2013/14 to 2015/16
almost a quarter of monetary violations received tickets, during the same period consistently less
than 5% of non-monetary violations were ticketed.

FIGURE 1 HERE

To better understand how tickets are used in ES enforcement, it is useful to consider ticketing
practices in relation to specific ES violations. Figure 2, which presents data pooled across fiscal
years 2012/13 to 2015/16, depicts the use of tickets for the following ES monetary violations:
overtime pay, minimum wage, public holiday pay, vacation pay, and unpaid wages (the latter
violation is not mandated for inspections but is nevertheless assessed occasionally). It also depicts
the use of tickets for the following non-monetary ES violations: record keeping, wage statements,
poster/postering, and excess daily or weekly hours of work.
In terms of absolute numbers, tickets are most commonly issued for overtime pay violations
(306 tickets), public holiday pay violations (454 tickets), and record keeping violations (125
tickets) (Figure 2). Among monetary ES violations, tickets are most prevalent when there are
violations of minimum wages (31% of detected violations). Tickets for violations of overtime pay
are the second most prevalent (27% of detected violations). Finally, ESOs ticket detected unpaid
10

wage violations 21% of the time, and detected holiday pay violations 17% of the time, both less
often than might be expected.5
FIGURE 2 HERE

Overall, ESOs are less likely to ticket non-monetary violations of all sorts than monetary
violations. Among non-monetary violations, tickets for record keeping are most common; still,
only 6% of record keeping violations are ticketed. While it is readily understandable why monetary
violations are more frequently ticketed than non-monetary violations, the reasons for differences
in ticketing between the various non-monetary violations are less obvious.
We can also consider how ticketing practices are influenced by multiple employment
standards violations and by the amount of the entitlement associated with violating a monetary ES.
On average, workplace inspections with a higher number of violations are more likely to receive
a ticket. In inspections where tickets are issued, the average number of monetary violations
detected is twice as large as the average number of monetary violations detected in inspections
where no ticket is issued. Additonally, as Table 3 shows, inspections that detect both monetary
and non-monetary violations are more likely to be ticketed (32%) than those where only monetary
violations are detected (22%) or those where only non-monetary violations are detected (7%).
While it is not surprising that tickets are issued less frequently where only non-monetary violations
are detected, we did not expect that multiple monetary violations would be less likely to result in
a ticket than a combination of monetary and non-monetary violations. One possible explanation is
that inspectors perceive that the combination of poor record keeping and monetary violations
creates a high risk of future violations that a ticket might deter.
Not suprisingly, workplace inspections that detected the need for greater restitution for
employees, in terms of the dollar amount of unpaid entitlements, are also more likely to result in a
ticket. In workplace inspections where a ticket is issued, the median entitlement amount is $1,576;
in contrast, in workplace inspections where a ticket is not issued this amount was only $591. Such
findings suggest that, consistent with deterrence theory, the greater the number and size of
confirmed monetary violations, the higher the likelihood of receiving a ticket.

TABLE 3 HERE
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E. The use of tickets and employer's industry and size
In general, there appears to be little relationship between an ESO’s decision to issue a ticket and
either the industry or company size of the workplace concerned (Table 3). An exception is the
accommodation and food services industry, where employers are seemingly ticketed more
frequently than in the other listed industries. A strategic enforcement approach (Weil, 2008)
suggests that greater use of deterrence measures is required in industries that have a higher
incidence of violations; the finding may thereby indicate that this approach is having some
influence on ticketing practices in Ontario. However, the fact that small employers are more
frequent ES violators (Vosko, Noack and Tucker, 2016: 111) but are not more frequently ticketed
suggests that the strategic enforcement model is making only limited inroads.
F. The use of tickets and inspection characteristics
We have indicated that inspections can be divided conceptually into three main types: expanded
investigations, targeted or blitz inspections and regular inspections. Here we consider the use of
tickets in each of these types of inspection. Table 3 shows that almost 25% of expanded
investigations resulted in a ticket compared to 17% for targeted inspections and 18% for regular
inspections. One reason for this discrepancy may be that expanded inspections find monetary
violations more frequently than other types of inspections and thus arguably represent a critical
tool for bridging the reactive and proactive elements of the province’s ES enforcement regime
(Vosko, Noack and Tucker, 2016: 7, 107).
Tickets are also more common when an ESO has to make multiple visits during the inspection.
Only 7% of inspections where no field visit or only one field visit occurred prompted a ticket. In
comparison, half of the inspections where five or more field visits occurred prompted a ticket.
Without more information about the reasons why some inspections require multiple field visits,
explanations for the increased likelihood of a ticket being issued are necessarily speculative, but
to the extent that more field visits are required because non-cooperation or poor record-keeping
make it more difficult for ESOs to perform their work, ESOs may view such visits as reasons to
signal their displeasure by issuing a ticket.
When we examine the incidence of ticketing with respect to audits, described earlier, not
surprisingly we find that tickets are issued more frequently for employers who are required to
conduct a self audit (27%) or who undergo a full audit (25%) than for employers who are subject
12

to a test audit (11%).

This is because self audits are only ordered when test audits find

contraventions and full audits are only required when the employer does not complete the test audit
(AMES S. 4.7.5). The use of self-audits and full-audits are likely to indicate that an employer has
more extensive ES violations, which may also explain why they are more likely to result in tickets.
G. The use of tickets in re-inspections
A key question centres on whether or not tickets are more commonly issued in instances of repeat
violations on a re-inspection. Both strategic enforcement and responsive regulation approaches
emphasize the escalation of deterrence measures for repeat violators. The AMES (S. 4.3, 4.4) states
that re-inspections should take place either as part of the Ministry’s program to monitor levels of
compliance or as part of the ESO’s performance plan, which establishes a set number of reinspections in a fiscal year. In the latter context, ESOs exercise discretion in selecting employers
for re-inspection, but are advised to strongly consider employers to whom the officer previously
issued an order to pay wages or fees in the course of a previous inspection or, if the officer found
more than one monetary contravention, whether or not any enforcement action was taken. Reinspections should occur at least six months, but no later than twelve months, after the conclusion
of the initial inspection. Employers are warned in advance that they will be re-inspected and,
indeed, the AMES (S. 4.4) directs ESOs to advise all employers that they may be subject to a reinspection. Although AMES provides advice about the scope of the re-inspection (normally
focusing on the standards found previously to have been violated), nothing is said about the
appropriate enforcement action if a repeat violation is detected.
The AMES (S. 4.4) also states that, to ensure continuing compliance with the ESA, 10% of
employers are to be re-inspected per fiscal year, although the evidence from Figure 3 indicates that
the MOL does not give high priority to re-inspections; the vast majority of employers (93%) were
inspected only once from 2012/13 to 2015/16.6 Among those employers inspected only once, 66%
were found to have committed at least one ticketable violation, and ESOs issued tickets in 18% of
those inspections. In comparision, among employers inspected more than once, ESOs detected
ticketable violations 83% of the time on first inspection, and a ticket was issued in 27% of those
inspections. This result is consistent with the AMES recommendation that ESOs should select
firms for re-inspection that were previously issued an order to pay or that had more than one
monetary violation, regardless of whether previous enforcement action was taken. The fact that an
13

ESO detected a monetary violation or issued a ticket on the first inspection increases the likelihood
of that employer being selected for a re-inspection. Employers who were inspected more than once
also tended to have higher employee entitlements on their first inspection compared to employers
who were only inspected once.

FIGURE 3 HERE

The next question is whether ESOs issue tickets more frequently when they detect ticketable
violations on a re-inspection. Figure 3 shows us that while 41% of all re-inspected employers had
a ticketable violation on subsequent inspection, only 28% of such offenders were issued a ticket.
However, in Figure 3 the focus is on all inspections which does not differentiate between
employers who only had ticketable violations on their first inspection and those who did not. We
turn, therefore, to Figure 4, which presents only those 477 re-inspected employers who had a
ticketable violation on their first inspection.

FIGURE 4 HERE

Among the 27% of employers who were issued a ticket on their first inspection, 33% were found
to have re-offended on the re-inspection, but only 19% of these employers were issued tickets. On
the other hand, among the 73% of employers who had a ticketable violation but were not issued a
ticket, 42% had violations on their re-inspection and of these 31% were issued tickets. These
results suggest that receiving a ticket on a first inspection is indeed associated with less likelihood
of employers having a ticketable violation on a re-inspection. This finding is consistent with the
view that tickets have a specific deterrent effect and reduces the likelihood of a subsequent
violation. However, it is also peculiar that ESOs are less likely to issue a ticket to a re-offending
employer who did not learn from their first ticket than they are to issue a ticket to a re-offending
employer who was not ticketed in the first instance since all enforcement theories indicate that
employers who re-offend after receiving a ticket should face escalating penalties, whereas clearly
they do not. However, employers who enjoyed the benefit of ESO discretion and were not ticketed
on their initial inspection — despite the presence of a ticketable violation — were treated more
harshly when they were found to have re-offended on re-inspection, a finding consistent with the
recommendations of the various enforcement theories discussed.
14

H. Predicting when tickets are issued
To further reveal how different criteria are related to the issuance of tickets in workplace
inspections, a logistic regression model is used to examine whether or not an inspection where a
ticketable violation is detected and recorded is likely to yield a ticket based on the following
criteria: company size, industry, type of inspection, entitlement amount, number of field visits,
type of audit completed, and fiscal year (see Table 4). The merit of applying this type of model is
that it determines the independent effect of each of these characteristics and their relation to
whether or not a ticket is issued. The results generally mirror the results from the bivariate analysis
presented earlier. As observed previously, company size does not have a substantial effect.
Companies that are associated with public or private service industries are slightly less likely to be
ticketed compared to companies in the accommodation and food services industry. However,
complementing the descriptive findings above, a model of this sort underscores the importance of
inspection characteristics (i.e., inspection type, number of field visits etc.) in predicting when
tickets will be issued. As total entitlement amounts increase, there is also an incremential increase
in the likelihood of being issued a ticket. However, there is little difference between inspections
with entitlement amounts of less than $300 and inspections where only non-monetary violations
are assessed. Compared to regular inspections, tickets are more likely to be issued in expanded
investigations. Similarly, the odds of being issued a ticket increase for each additional field visit
by an ESO. For example, the odds of being issued a ticket when five or more field visits take place
during an inspection are over nine times higher than when one or fewer field visits take place.
Inspections where the employer completed a self-audit or the ESO completed a full audit are also
more likely to yield a ticket compared to inspections where the ESO only conducts a test audit.

TABLE 4 HERE

IV. Discussion
Theoretical perspectives on the use of deterrence measures provide context for understanding these
empirical results. First, these findings demonstrate that tickets are used far more frequently in
workplace inspections than they are in the investigation of individual complaints; they thus provide
a more nuanced picture of the use of deterrence measures in Ontario than was possible in our
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previous study of deterrence writ large. That said, the prevalence of tickets, at least when measured
against detected and recorded ticketable violations, is low — fewer than one in ten. As a result,
most employers can expect that, even if they are inspected and a violation is detected, the most
likely consequence is that they will be required to correct the violation, either by paying what they
owe in the case of monetary violations or by complying in the future with record keeping and other
similar obligations. From a deterrence perspective, the prevalence of ticketing on inspections is
still exceedingly low.
Our results also reveal some more specific patterns in the use of tickets. Detected monetary
violations are more likely to be ticketed than non-monetary violations and, among monetary
violations, overtime pay, minimum wage, and public holiday pay violations are most likely to
result in tickets. Employers with multiple violations, particularly if there are both monetary and
non-monetary violations, are more likely to be ticketed than employers with a single detected
violation and, where there is a monetary violation, the likelihood of being ticketed increases with
the amount owed. All of these findings are consistent with the deterrence theory perspective that
the greater the number and seriousness of violations, the harsher treatment they should receive.
However, there is a serious question as to whether ticketing, no matter its frequency, achieves
a deterrent effect. To our knowledge, there has been no previous research into the deterrent effect
of tickets in the literature on ES; however, the issue has received more attention in the context of
occupational health and safety regulation. In a study of workplace health and safety (WHS)
enforcement in Australia, Bluff and Johnstone (2003) discussed issues arising out of the use of
‘infringement notices’ (equivalent to tickets). They found that such notices may be appropriately
used to deal with minor offences particularly if unwitting. But they raised a concern that notices
might turn offences into ‘purchasable commodities’ that have little deterrent effect (Bluff and
Johnstone, 2003: 341-42).
In principle, whether or not notices or tickets have a deterrent effect is an empirical question,
but one on which there has been limited research. Gunningham et al. (1998: 338-339) interviewed
Australian policy-makers, inspectors, industry partners, and recipients of infringement notices, and
found that most respondents believed that despite a short-term positive effect on compliance, that
improvements were more likely to be sustained if resources were provided for continuing
enforcement. Subsequent research on WHS enforcement has tended to confirm that inspections
with penalties have strong specific deterrent effects, but limited general deterrent effects. For
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example, Gray and Scholz (1993) found while brief inspections without penalties had no injuryreducing effects, those that included even small penalties significantly reduced injuries and lost
work days. A recent systematic review of the WHS enforcement literature by Tompa et al. (2016)
found strong evidence that inspections involving penalties are effective and moderate-to-limited
evidence that those finding wrongdoing but absent penalties are ineffective. The authors concluded
that this finding ‘reinforces the importance of regulators being out in the field identifying and
citing/penalizing non-compliance’ (Tompa et al., 2016: 929). More recently, Hardy and Howe
(2017) found in the context of ES enforcement in Australia that targeted enforcement campaigns
have a modest general deterrence ripple effect and that the size of the penalty is less important.
Our study provides some evidence on the specific deterrent effects of inspections and ticketing
in Ontario ES enforcement. Figure 3 shows that of the 573 employers inspected more than once,
477 (83%) had ticketable violations on their first inspection, but only 41% of these employers had
ticketable offences on their second. This decrease in the prevalence of ticketable violations on reinspection suggests that inspections reduce the likelihood that an employer will re-offend in the
six to twelve-month period following the inspection, but it does not tell us about the relative
deterrent effect of inspections with and without penalties. Figure 4 enables us to analyse these
effects by differentiating between employers who were ticketed on the first inspection and those
who were not. Among those employers who had ticketable violations but were not ticketed on their
first inspection, 42% were found to have re-offended on re-inspection. By contrast, among
employers who were ticketed on their first violation, only 33% were found to have re-offended on
a re-inspection. These data suggest that inspections with tickets have a marginally greater deterrent
effect than inspections without tickets. However, they also provide evidence that inspections
without tickets, coupled with a warning that the employer may be re-inspected, also have a specific
deterrent effect, supporting the view that proactive inspections of all kinds should be a prominent
part of any enforcement strategy.
When viewed from the perspective of responsive regulation and the enforcement pyramid, a
relatively low rate of ticketing on first inspections is justified on the basis that employers with
detected violations should be given the benefit of the doubt that their violations were inadvertent.
However, that presumption should give way in the face of evidence to the contrary, such as the
presence of multiple violations, particularly those involving large sums of money owing to
employees. Our findings suggest that ESOs have incorporated that perspective in regard to
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ticketing on first inspections. However, as this study and OHS studies demonstrate, such an
approach comes at the cost of foregoing the greater specific deterrent effects that inspections with
tickets produce.
The pattern of ticketing on re-inspections is more problematic from the pyramid perspective.
Employers with a ticketable violation on a re-inspection are not more likely to be ticketed than
those who had a ticketable violation on their first inspection. However, when we narrowed the
analysis to employers who had a ticketable violation on the first inspection and who re-offended
on the second, we found that the enforcement pyramid seemed to apply in regard to employers
who were not ticketed in the first instance, but that those employers who were ticketed on the first
inspection faced a reduced likelihood of being ticketed for a repeat violation.
Perhaps in an attempt to better address the problem of lax treatment of re-offending employers,
Ontario conducted an enforcement blitz in 2016, targeting employers with prior ES violations. In
announcing the blitz, the government declared that it was adopting a zero-tolerance policy, which
presumably indicated that repeat violators would face a penalty. In practice, however, nothing of
this sort happened. Of the 104 employers who were re-inspected in the context of the blitz, 77 were
found to be in violation again. Yet only 15 NOCs and 27 tickets were issued (Ontario MOL, 2017;
Mojtehedzadeh, 2017). Even assuming that no employer received multiple tickets or NOCs, the
result is that only 55% of repeat offenders were subject to low-level deterrence measures. Thus,
despite the promise of adherence to a strict enforcement pyramid in this blitz, it did not materialise.
Finally, from the perspective of strategic enforcement, it is arguable that, as a general matter, the
deterrence leg of the strategy is under-used. More specifically, although there is some evidence
that at least one industry, accommodation and food services (likely to be a site of high levels of
violations) is ticketed somewhat more frequently than other industries, the difference is small. As
well, small employers, also known as a location of more frequent ES violations, are not more likely
to receive tickets. While this practice might be justified in strategic enforcement if there was a
targeted effort to engage entities at the top of the supply chain to secure compliance at the bottom,
no initiatives of this sort are yet underway in Ontario.

V. Conclusion
In recent years, the Ontario government has modestly shifted its approach to ES enforcement
toward greater use of proactive inspections with tickets when violations are detected. This shift is
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likely to continue. In 2017 special advisors appointed to conduct the Changing Workplaces Review
(2017) recommended allocating more resources to proactive enforcement, increasing the use of
targeted inspections and expanded investigations and increasing penalties for tickets and NOCs.
The government embraced the idea of strengthening enforcement and committed to hiring as many
as 175 new ESOs by 2021, inspecting 1 in 10 Ontario workplaces annually, and better targeting
enforcement resources on employers who violate the ESA (Government of Ontario, 2017).
However, while it enacted legislation that would permit a flexible schedule of penalties for NOCs,
the government did not increase the set fines for tickets (Fair Workplaces, Better Jobs Act, 2017).
Our research broadly supports increased use of proactive inspections with low-level
penalties. Of course, we recognise that proactive inspections and deterrence are only one leg of
an effective enforcement strategy, but given the long history of compliance-based approaches
that minimise the role of proactive enforcement and penalties, often in response to active
resistance, our research provides empirical support for maintaining a healthy role for deterrence
in the enforcement mix.
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Table 1: Comparing the use of tickets and Notices of Contravention in workplace inspections and individual
complaints
2012/13
PART I TICKETS
Complaints
Ticketable Violations
Part I Tickets
% of Ticketable Violations with Tickets
Inspections
Ticketable Violations
Part I Tickets
% of Ticketable Violations with Tickets

----

NOTICES OF CONTRAVENTION
Complaints
Total Number of Violations
Notices of Contravention
% of Complaints with Notices of Contravention
Inspections
Total Number of Violations
Notices of Contravention
% of Inspections with Notices of Contravention

2013/14

2014/15

11,751
121
1.0%

10,196
186
1.8%

4,870
298
6.1%

3,723
348
9.3%

2,781
259
9.3%

12,079
60
0.5%

12,071
79
0.7%

10,476
68
0.6%

4,958
42
0.8%

3,786
20
0.5%

2,849
34
1.2%

2015/16

---4,907
450
9.2%

---4,676
35
0.7%

Source: ESIS data 2012/13 to 2015/16

Note: Data for complaints are not available for 2015/16 as complaints take longer to process than inspections. Data on tickets in
complaints for 2012/13 are suppressed due to small counts.
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Table 2: Prevalence of ticketable violations and the use of tickets in workplace inspections, by fiscal year
2012/13 2013/14 2014/15 2015/16

Total

Total Number of Inspections
Number of Inspections with Ticketable Violations
% of Inspections with Ticketable Violations

2,349
1,674
71.3%

1,902
1,297
68.2%

1,747
989
56.6%

2,548
1,621
63.6%

8,546
5,581
65.3%

Number of Inspections with One or More Tickets Issued
% of Inspections with Ticketable Violations with One or More Tickets Issued

259
15.5%

280
21.6%

207
20.9%

330
20.4%

1,076
19.3%

Source: ESIS data 2012/13 to 2015/16
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Table 3: Characteristics of workplace inspections with ticketable violations
where tickets are issued, 2012/13 to 2015/16 (pooled)
Ticket Not
Issued

Ticket
Issued

93.3%
77.7%
68.2%

6.7%
22.3%
31.8%

$591

$1,576

77.7%
80.5%
81.9%
83.3%
84.4%

22.3%
19.5%
18.1%
16.7%
15.6%

81.7%
82.0%
79.9%
79.3%
81.5%

18.3%
18.0%
20.1%
20.7%
18.5%

INSPECTION CHARACTERISTICS
Type of Inspection
Expanded
Targeted and THA Blitz
Regular
Others

75.1%
82.9%
81.7%
83.3%

24.9%
17.1%
18.3%
16.7%

Number of Field Visits
0 or 1 Visit
2 Visits
3 Visits

93.0%
81.8%
75.3%

7.0%
18.2%
24.7%

ES VIOLATION CHARACTERISTICS
Type of Violations (Inspections with Multiple
Violations)
Two or More Non-Monetary Violations
Two or More Monetary Violations
Both Monetary and Non-Monetary Violations
Total Entitlement Amount
Median
EMPLOYER CHARACTERISTICS
Industry
Accommodation and Food Services
Manufacturing and Primary Industriesa
Retail Trade
Service Industries - primarily private-sectorb
Service Industries - primarily public-sectorc
Company Size
1 to 5 employees
6 to 10 employees
11 to 19 employees
20 to 49 employees
50 or more employees
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4 Visits
5 + Visits

62.7%
50.0%

37.3%
50.0%

Type of Audit Completed
Test Audit
Self Audit
Full Audit
No Audit

89.1%
73.4%
75.0%
79.6%

10.9%
26.6%
25.0%
20.4%

Source: ESIS data 2012/13 to 2015/16

Note:
a

Industries include: agriculture, forestry, fishing, mining, oil, gas, utilities, construction,
manufacturing, wholesale trade, transportation, and warehousing
b

Industries include: finance, insurance, real estate, leasing, professional, scientific and technical
services, management, and administrative and other support services
c

Industries include: include: educational services, health care and social assistance, public
administration, information, culture, and recreation
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Table 4: Logistic regression modelling the probability of a workplace
inspection yielding a ticket, 2012/13 to 2015/16 (pooled)
B

Odds
Ratio

0.00

1.00

6 to 10 employees

-0.27

0.76

11 to 19 employees

-0.13

0.88

20 to 49 employees

-0.20

0.82

50 or more employees

-0.30

0.74

Missing company size information

-0.37

0.69

0.00

1.00

-0.10

0.91

-0.16

0.85

-0.30

0.74

-0.39

0.68

Regular (reference)

0.00

1.00

Expanded Investigation

0.36

1.43

Targeted and THA Blitz

0.14

1.15

Other

0.03

1.03

Less than $300 (reference)

0.00

1.00

$300 to $999

0.77

2.17

$1,000 to $1,999

1.12

3.07

$2,000 to $9,999

1.44

4.24

$10,000 or more

1.97

7.17

-0.07

0.93

0 or 1 Visit (reference)

0.00

1.00

2 Visits

1.00

2.71

3 Visits

1.22

3.37

4 Visits

1.83

6.24

5 + Visits

2.24

9.38

0.00

1.00

Company Size
1 to 5 employees (reference)

Industry (based on the NAICS)
Accommodation and Food Services (reference)
Manufacturing and Primary Industries

a

Retail Trade
Service Industries - primarily private-sectorb
Service Industries - primarily public-sector

c

Type of Inspection

Entitlement Amounts

Non-Monetary
Number of Field Visits

Type of Audit Completed
Test Audit (reference)
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Self Audit

0.26

1.29

Full Audit

0.36

1.43

No Audit

0.65

1.91

2012/13 (reference)

0.00

1.00

2013/14

0.42

1.53

2014/15

0.44

1.55

2015/16

0.35

1.42

Fiscal Year

Source: ESIS data 2012/13 to 2015/16

Note:
a

Industries include: agriculture, forestry, fishing, mining, oil, gas, utilities, construction,
manufacturing, wholesale trade, transportation, and warehousing
b

Industries include: finance, insurance, real estate, leasing, professional, scientific and technical
services, management, and administrative and other support services
c

Industries include: include: educational services, health care and social assistance, public
administration, information, culture, and recreation
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Figure 1: Percentage of ticketable violations which result in tickets
25%

20%

15%

10%

5%

0%
2012/13

2013/14

2014/15

% of violations which result in a ticket

2015/16

% of monetary violations which result in a ticket

% of non-monetary violations which result in a ticket
Source: ESIS data 2012/13 to 2015/16
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Figure 2: Percentage and number of tickets issued, by violation (2012/13 to 2015/16, pooled)
Number of Tickets/
Number of Violations
MONETARY VIOLATIONS
Minimum Wage
Overtime Pay
Unpaid Wages
Public Holiday Pay
Vacation Pay
NON-MONETARY VIOLATIONS
Record Keeping
Wage Statements
Postering
Excess Daily or Weekly Hours

81/258
306/1,128
37/178
454/2,631
28/428
125/2,106
63/1,108
50/889
77/2,087
0%

5%

10%

15%

20%

25%

30%

35%

Source: ESIS data 2012/13 to 2015/16

Note:
When violations are detected and recorded in workplace inspections, they typically include multiple ticketable offences. Ticketable
offences were categorized into the above monetary and non-monetary violations based on the ESA sections that were specified in the
record.
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Figure 3: The use of tickets in first inspections or re-inspections, all inspected employers

7,922 Inspections

573 Employers with More than One
Inspection

7,349 Employers Inspected only once

66% with Ticketable Violations
(n=4,857)

18% with Ticket Issued
(n=878)

83% with Ticketable
Violations on First
Inspection
(n=477)

41% with Ticketable
Violations on Subsequent
Inspection
(n=234)

27% with Ticket Issued
(n=131)

28% with Ticket Issued
(n=66)
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Figure 4: The use of tickets for repeat inspections, employers with ticketable violations in first inspection

477 Employers with Ticketable Violations on First Inspection

131 (27%)
Issued a Ticket on First Inspection

346 (73%)
Not Issued a Ticket on First Inspection

43 (33%)
Ticketable Violations
on Repeat Inspections

146 (42%)
Ticketable Violations
on Repeat Inspections

8 (19%)
Tickets Issued

45 (31%)
Tickets Issued
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1

Access to data from ESIS was acquired under a unique data-sharing agreement with the MOL.
We are grateful to this Ministry and its staff for engaging in this agreement and for supporting
the larger research partnership from which this article emanates.
2
This analysis uses the government fiscal year, which runs from April 1st to March 31st.
3
A smaller number of inspections are classified as 'other' inspections: these include reinspections or inspections of previous ES violators, inspections that result from an employer
completing the MOL's online ‘compliance check’ (self-audit) tool, or those that are specifically
prompted by other ESOs, regional and district managers, or the staff of the EPB.
4
ESOs conducting inspections may not record every violation they detect. For example, an ESO
may inspect a workplace and find that the employer has failed to post a mandatory poster. Rather
than record this as a violation, the ESO may simply provide the employer with a poster, which is
immediately posted, and continue the inspection. Thus, we stipulate that the violation must be
both detected and recorded.
5
The relatively low number of unpaid wage violations and the low use of tickets for these
violations may be attributable to the fact that unpaid wages are not one of the 11 designated
standards that ESOs are required to review in inspections; this is not the case, however, for
vacation pay violations.
6
This percentage may understate the actual frequency of repeat inspections as it is possible that
an insufficient amount of time lapsed for repeat inspections to be undertaken among those
employers inspected in 2015/16.
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